THE ORIGINS AND PECULIARITIES OF THE IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF TONY BLAIR'S FOREIGN POLICY MODEL

Abstract: An identity of a state leader and his team as well as government bodies which could be transformed by the leader have a great influence on the state developing process. This thesis is particularly relevant to the period of Tony Blair's Great Britain. His leadership model is one of the most controversial one in the modern world. This issue became especially relevant after the publication of Chilcot Committee's report concerning the situation on Iraq. Ideological basisis one of the most important part of this model because it determines "originality" of blerism. This paper examines origins of Tony Blair's ideology as well as traditional and new aspects of the "New Labour" power. More specifically, it suggests "the British Crisis" after the World War II as the start point for British identity rethinking process. Churchillism and Thatcherism are considered as the basis of blerism. Special attention attends to the ethical dimension of "the Third Way" ideology. The discussion concludes with investigation of idea about "Transatlantic Bridge" and its impact on specific of Euro-Atlantic direction.

Author information:
Maksym Prykhnenko
PhD student at the Department of International Relations and Foreign Policy, Vasyl' Stus Donetsk National University, Vinnytsia
✉ mprikhnenko@gmail.com
🌐 Ukraine

Keywords:
Europe; Great Britain; New Labour; Tony Blair; Blerism; the British Crisis; «the Third Way».

Introduction

Great Britain is one of the key European countries that is usually considered as an "unsuitable partner" and belongs to the so-called group of Eurosceptics. Such a status is determined by a number of historical, cultural, economic and political factors including the "special relationship" with the USA.

There are a lot of outstanding statesmen and politicians in the history of international relations who have brought considerable influence on their development. However, only a small percent of those people have created an efficient, logically built policy model. Speaking about Great Britain in the period from after the World War II up until now, in our opinion, we can speak about three such political figures as - Sir Winston Leonard Spencer-Churchill (Churchillism), Baroness Margaret Hilda Thatcher (Thatcherism) and Anthony Charles Lynton Blair (Blairism).

Each of these models is, to some extent, unique and aimed at the consolidation of the country's role on the international stage. However, each of these politicians, in our opinion, forming his or her political line always acted on the principle of the "three majestic circles" that was introduced by Winston Churchill in 1948. This principle did not presuppose focusing on diplomatic efforts of the state exclusively on the continent. On the contrary, in his opinion, Britain, having the exclusive status as a worldwide leader, would not be able to become a member of the continental associationbut only to support this regional project and to facilitate the European unity development. He emphasized that for Britain to enter a European Union from which the Empire and Commonwealth would be excluded, would not only be impossible but would, in the eyes of Europe, enormously reduce the value of our participation (Blake, Louis 1993: 452).

Margaret Thatcher's coming to power signified the transformation of Great Britain at a whole new and higher level. She gave a name to the whole epoch having formed a clear concept of the foreign policy over the years. It was in the time of her rule that those principles and processes which we can observe even today were laid into the political basis.

These traditions that had been established by M. Thatcher were continued to a certain extent, though they were considerably modernized in Tony Blair's foreign policy. Blairists' leadership model thatcomes down to an expression of acting "beyond the powers" of the head of government became an important element of change. During T. Blair's work period, foreign policy became a key issue on the agenda. The consequences of this policy can be felt even nowadays. This issue became especially relevant after the publication of Chilcot Committee's report concerning the situation with Iraq. That is why to understand the peculiarities of the foreign policy model that was formed by Tony Blair is an important factor of the analysis of the policy that is being implemented by the United Kingdom today.

The objective of the study is to characterize the origins and peculiarities of the ideological basis of Tony Blair's foreign policy model.

"The British Crisis": means of overcoming it after the World War II

The "factor of depression" in the state's foreign policy after the World War II

The historical circumstances in which Great Britain found itself after the World War II were heavily unique, as the unusual war was over causing not less unusual consequences both for the foreign relations system and for the British foreign policy. As a rule, in the postwar period, London was analyzing a newly created power balance. Now it had to pay attention to the very place of Great Britain in the new international system. Dean Acheson, a United States Secretary of State, placed greater focus on the fact that Great Britain had already lost its previous status and had not found a new place in the newly created global system (Hollowell 2003: 14).

The academic aspect of thematic justification of the issue lies in the fact that in their works Soviet historians and also part of modern Russian historians presented a concept according to which England was mostly considered as a "younger partner" or even a "puppet" of the United States. As for modern Ukrainian historiography, it focuses mostly on London's foreign policy after the end of the Cold War and on its European policy. In the meantime, the interest of British researchers in the country's transformation after the war remains invariably high. A vivid example of this is the book written by Geoffrey Fry called "The Politics of Decline. An Interpretation of British Politics from the 1940s to the 1970s" (2005). The subject of Richard English's and Michael Kenny's research was not the historical process of the decline itself but the "theories of the decline"; they think that the concept of the decline remains the central concept in the intellectual discourse about modern British history and politics(English, Kenny 1999: 252-266).

The nature of the idea of the British foreign policy decline and transformation after the war is based upon the two interconnected tendencies – unadapted thinking of political elite regarding new conditions of international collaboration on the one hand, and, the process of the state economy adaptation to the new conditions of functioning on the other. The emergence of the above-mentioned tendencies was caused by the following factors:

- the economic weakening: the burden of foreign military losses, high rate of pound exchange, domestic investments deficit and so on.
  - the loss of the "hegemon" status in the foreign affairs.
  - the preservation of onerous obligations connected with the Empire status.
  - the absence of the economic sector reorganization process.
  - the specific character of a new bipolar confrontation.

On the other hand, the political regime of the state was not significantly changed. As a result, the United Kingdom was a part of the so-called "Group of Three", opinions of which had a great impact on the postwar world order formation. A certain special status of the state was secured by its place as a permanent member of the Security Council in a newly created United Nations Organization. However, in our opinion, the dividends that were paid due to the status as one of the winners of the

war, gave quite a deceptive optimism as to the real status of Britain in the international relations. The essence of this optimism we can find in the speech of the eminent economist Maynard Keynes in the House of Lords in 1944, during which he expressed his hope for the state to come out of the war not only with a convincing victory over its enemies but also with a firm friendship with its allies, and also with a deep respect of the global community that can be bigger than ever in the British history (Fry 2005: 17).

As for the opinion of Washington, it should be paid special attention to. While Keynes thought that the USA was interested in strong Britain, the American government did not see any special role in it and in the Empire. The erroneous idea concerning American perception was maintaining its influence on the English government for a long time. In 1962, delivering his speech to the graduates of West Point Military Academy,D. Acheson pointed out that even considering special American-British relationships, he did not see a separate, beyond the united Europe, international role of Great Britain. And even then, after the emblematic Suez Crisis, this thought caused a lot of controversies in London.

In some degree, this shock appeared due to a widespread interpretation of the British-American relationships among the English statesmen through the historical analogy with"Greeks and Romans" (meaning the role of the former in the imperial policy formation of the latter). A similar way of relations should have ensured a privileged position for Great Britain in a specific American hegemony during the Cold War (the so-called "open hegemony")(Dumbrell 2006: 17).

It would be a mistake to narrow the postwar "statusness" of Great Britain only by, so to speak, moral authority. Christopher Coker, a famous British historian, draws attention to its entirely material parameters. Despite its relative weakness, the United Kingdom was the most powerful European state whose military expenses and the product volume in the military-industrial sector exceeded the similar index of all the European countries combined (Coker 2003).

One of the key factors which determined the country's foreign policy was a certain consensus as for the maintenance of the great global state role, first of all, between the Conservatives and the Labourists. It also determined the continuity of global strategy. The differences between the leading parties in the foreign policy course undoubtedly took place, but, firstly, they did not go beyond the "three majestic circles" introduced by W. Churchill. Secondly, the contradictions applied rather to the methods of the implementation of the great global state role.

Attlee-Bevin's foreign policy was strategically (in the long-term) based on the concept of the "third force". However, in the short-term, considering England's relative weakness and the significance of the USA in the Cold War, the main goal of their country for the Labourist leaders was the following: to hold the USA from their return to the isolationism (as it happened after the World War I); to induce the USA with all their power to restore Europe as fast as possible and to restrain communism;to play the role of a transatlantic link; to prevent the confrontation transformation from the "cold" stage to the "hot" (direct military clash). As far as the latter goal is concerned, C. Attlee's visit to Washington in 1950 is often regarded in the context of convincing the White House not to use a nuclear weapon in Korea. Provided that the resources of the restored Europe and its overseas territories were mobilized and the position of Britain in the Commonwealth is maintained, London in the long-term was planning to become the leader of the "middle of the planet" thereby securing its position in the leading triumvirate of the new world order (Shlaim 1975: 840).

With the Conservatives headed by W. Churchill coming to power in 1951, the main principle, to remain being the great global state, did not change. According to the concept of the "three majestic circles", the United Kingdom could not belong entirely to one of the circles without spoiling relations inside the other two. It is clear that such an interpretation of interdependency of the "three majestic circles" made it impossible for the country to get the status different from the global. At the same time, as opposed to Attlee, Churchill emphasized that the British-American relationships were the priority. As far as the format was concerned, the Conservatives leader tended to feel nostalgic for the "Group of

Three" during the wartime. It was not a coincidence that the last years of his second tenure Winston Churchill was trying to unsuccessfully call for a tripartite summit. In doing so, he assigned the part to himself as a moderator, a peacemaker and a person who wanted to prevent a possible Soviet-American nuclear conflict.

The understanding of British postwar policy requires taking into account factors which happened in the past. First, quite clear signs of a relative decline appeared already at the beginning of the 20th century and developed further during the interwar period. Second, traditional principles of England's foreign policy had a great influence. It was a priority for the British elite to maintain the status of the great state rather than modernize it, as it required some domestic investments. The means of supporting the status under the conditions of the economic and the military possibilities reduction was to maintain the status of the Empire. Historically, with a long-term hegemon status, it has become a habit with the British imperial elite to think big and to have a peculiar vision of the foreign affairs agenda.

Traditional British pragmatism, ora peculiar reasonable empiricism played by far not the least role. In the extreme case, it acquired the form of situational responses to the events and problems of the foreign policy. Similar conclusion is made, for example, by Jonathan Pearson (2003) indicating that after the World War II, there was no well-thought-out strategy in Great Britain's foreign policy resulting in the degradation to the responses to various circumstances.One can say that in thiscase maintaining the status of the great global state becomes nearly the only general principle.

Besides, the pragmatism favored the above-mentioned interparty consensus and restricted the influence on the extreme (or dogmatically "ideological") British policy. First of all, it concerns the Labourists. The realization of Attlee-Bevin's foreign policy line required the neutralization of the party's left-wing at any case.

The breaking point in reconsidering of the English foreign policy was the Suez Crisis. Last illusions regarding the possibility to preserve the Empire were dispelled by the Suez Crisis in 1956. It was the time when the major part of the British political class finally realized that the claims to maintain the status of the global state were not substantiated by neither economic nor military strength.

Suez fiasco only gave rise to, in the words of Acheson, a difficult process of "finding our own place in the world". A gradual decrease of the "great global state's" influence made the "three majestic circles" theory's disadvantages clear in a classic sort of way; it also made it necessary to refuse from the basic principle not to belong to only one of them. "Three majestic circles" actually became "three pine trees" of the global policy where London was wandering. For several decades,the special British-American relations were a general invariable principle of the foreign policy.The complete British crisis overcoming (meaning the crisis of the model) could occur only in case of adding the earlier missing (or too weak) general principles and generalized theories.

Margaret Thatcher and Thatcherism

With the Conservatives coming to power in 1979, Great Britain came to a new, higher level of the British foreign policy. M. Thatcher managed to understand the opinions of the British people regarding the country's necessity to be ruled by a "strong person who could improve the situation in the country and bring it to a higher level on the international stage".

In a certain way, M. Thatcher's government managed to reconsider the principle of the "unbalanced multi-vector nature" of the foreign policy and to create an integral sociopolitical model which would be based upon clear worldview principles. The British government was trying to build its course upon the following principles:
- social activity and personal responsibility restoration;
- priority of every citizen's interests.

Special attention was also paid to the role of the moral principles, the English traditional conservatism and the traditional for the state spiritual values of the Victorian period such as, for example, family, religion, law.

A rethinking of the policy's ideological principles gave rise to the Conservative government's actions. Transatlantic and European directions became the priority. The so-called east-of-Suez policy took a back seat, especially after the situation with RSA. Yet, the "Iron Lady" did not give up the idea of returning the status of the great state for Britain. Therefore, a lot of issues of global and regional value that were not at the top of the country's priority list were on the agenda. For instance, hardly had the British diplomacy come to power, they met with a difficult situation, namely, they had to resolve the lingering Rhodesian Crisis.After the conference in Lusaka in 1979, Britain took the role of an initiator and a guarantor ofthe constitutional reforms in Southern Rhodesia. During that conference, the Prime Minister showed determination to work within the program of the "Commonwealth" defending, at the same time, the country's own national interests. Blocking India's initiative to create an economic fund to support poor countries, andalso Jamaica's determination to create an international structure against drug mafia in developing countries showed Britain's efforts to build a policy based on pragmatism, rationalism and attempts of getting rid of traditional paternalism.

Great Britain supported the development of the Commonwealth by creating a multilateral international organization which would be operating according to the international law. This endeavor was supported by the Vancouver Commonwealth Declaration. During 1980, it managed to strengthen the economic influence of Britain in these territories.

As far as the priority directions are concerned, namely, the transatlantic and the European, M. Thatcher was trying to play the role of a mediator between the USA and the EEC. In the period of Thatcherism,it was typical of Great Britain to distance itself from the idea of the integration expansion within the European Union. Such opinions can probably be explained by the economic weakness (in comparison with Germany and France) that did not allow the country to get preferences from such actions.

At the same time, relationships with the USA, traditional connections with the countries of the Commonwealth, a position in the UN Security Council and other reinforcing factors are making Britain one of the key players of the EU.

Ronald Reagan's presidency marked the start of the relationshiptransformation at a more productive level in all directions. M. Thatcher was trying, so to speak, find her place "in the heart of the American president" faster than other politicians. In a certain way, the necessity of developing the relationships was determined by the support of the USA on behalf of the European partner with the purpose to improve the situation (first of all, economic), Japan and the members of the Single Market. Another factor that is considered reinforcing within the relationship between the two countries is the nuclear collaboration. It dates back to the beginning of the World War II when in 1942 W. Churchill and F. Roosevelt reached an agreement regarding the questions of arms manufacture, and a year later in Quebec they signed an agreement about the cooperation concerning nuclear issues.

In general, in her book "Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World" Margaret Thatcher (2003) made certain points that, in our opinion, could be considered as the base of her foreign policy course:

➢ in times of democracy, ruling a country without considering moral principles is almost impossible;
➢ the common sense must always stimulate moral obligation;
➢ transforming into democracy is legal in every country on every continent and, moreover, it is also a fundamental aspect ofa reasonable foreign policy.

The peculiarities of the conceptual principles of the Blairist foreign policy

Moralism and theethical aspect in politics

In a certain way, the year of 1994 was memorable for the Labour Party, as it had been already more than 10 years since the formation of a certain ideological and organizational stagnation in the process of the partydevelopment that both party members and the British people understood. There was also a certain decline in the state's policy development process. At that time, the state policy required a new ideological basis which would correspond to changes in the international environment. These are just the tasks that the foreign policy concept of the "third way" created by T. Blair had to perform. And the "New Labour" were trying to integrate this concept into the state's foreign policy course.

The ideological founder of a new concept for Britain was A. Giddens (1998),who formed the ideological framework of "New Labour" based on the necessity of the realization of a powerful, ethical idea of country's foreign policy line. In quite a simplified form the concept can be characterized as a tendency to a proper social structure based upon the principles of communitarianism.

The "Third Way" based on the following principles that constitute its ethical basis:
➢ the concept of personal security;
➢ human rights supremacy;
➢ the use of harsh methods to prevent crimes against humanity;
➢ state sovereignty abrogation in case of crimes against humanity;
➢ the increase ofeconomic performance;
➢ responsibility (first of all, social);
➢ operating elements modernization.

Similar changes resulted in the discussions regarding the ideas of "global interaction". Robin Cook, the British Foreign Secretary, thought that there was interdependency and interaction between events that can take place in different corners of the world. That is why, the balance between the traditional goals of the foreign policy and the ethical aspect became the main issue on the agenda.

Tony Blair (2006)defined the foreign policy approach that heinherited as the "doctrine of benign inactivity… the product of the conventional view of foreign policy since the fall of the Berlin Wall."He pointed out that such a vision is no longer critical.Blairists admit that economic problems are one of the major causes of conflicts with the use of force, thus the avoidance of conflicts requires the improvement of the economic status of the societies. Besides, poverty, in the words of Clare Short (1999) being a Secretary of State for International Development, is a big moral issue that stands before the world.

As part of the institutional pattern, an emphasis on the human rights protection was primarily represented by creating a special department in FCO which eventually was reorganized into the Department for International Development of Great Britain.

Speaking about the practical implementation of the ideas of moralism the following facts should be paid special attention to: creation of the Human Rights Foundation, aid in operating the International Criminal Court, participation in the courts martial of Yugoslavia and Rwanda, etc. Moreover, Tony Blair and his associates focused on the necessity of consideration of the interdependency problem between the economic and the political conditions in developing and underdeveloped countries, conflicts with the use of the "brutal force" and the rapid fall of living standards in these countries, and, as a result, the violation of rights and freedoms all over the world.

According to its logic, Blairist moralism demonstrated a connection with the interventionism. The British leader upheld the idea that modern warfare had fundamentally changed. He spoke about the war for spiritual values and ideas but not for material wealth. Focusing on the two world wars of the past century, he was trying to demonstrate the fact that a "frozen conflict",or an attempt to resolve

the differences by maintaining a status quo, or a permission to cultivate the idea that abuses people's morality and rights would eventually lead to a war with a "dictator", and far more people could die. In Tony Blair's opinion,the idea of non-interference in domestic affairs of a country under modern conditions becomes a moral duty in case when there is genocide, crimes against humanity, etc.

The events of September 11 in the USA changed the Prime Minister's priorities in this direction and the questions came into the categories of the "international safety support" and the "international counter-terrorism". Of course, the opponents of such an approach emphasize that a vindication of the ideas of human rights, an international safety and moral duties cannot virtually be appropriate for the agenda and for the implementation of the country's national interests.

The role of a tool by which moralism is "installed" into the Blairist foreign policy strategy is the "doctrine of international community" that was publicized by Tony Blair (1999) in Chicago. Further on, it was developed in the paper called "The Clash of Civilizations"(2006) and in the brochure called "A Global Alliance for Global Values"(2006).

Having incorporated such categories as "morality", "human rights", "interventionism", "personal security concept" and so on in his foreign policy model, Tony Blair managed to create a whole new country's foreign policy concept. Even though this new concept implies the use military power, moralism is the key idea of the Blairist ideological basis.It induced the creation of the concept of "liberal interventionism" and also practically implemented key decisions of Tony Blair's government (for instance, war in Iraq, international counter-terrorism and so on). The ethical aspect of Blairist foreign policy can be characterized by the two following principles that in practice came into conflict with each other:

- Great Britain must play an active role in the international community acting, at the same time, according to its rules and cooperating with the international institutions;

- Great Britain must use its influence aiming to protect and to consolidate liberal and social democratic values of human rights and democracy, to eradicate poverty, and to implement an efficient and fair government.

The logic of Blair's ideology and practice comes to the several crucial conclusions: the government has no choice;the foreign policy must be ethical, democratic countries may not implement unethical foreign policy; only the gradual implementation of the moralist strategy allows to avoid accusations of double standards.

The ethical component of T. Blair's foreign policy proves the global tendency of strengthening the role of the "personal safety" in the international relationships. It is no coincidence that the "doctrine of international community" agrees with numerous discussions in the theory of foreign relationships regarding the necessity of the modern world order reconsideration in the categories of the "world politics / world security" as opposed to the "international politics / international security".

Traditional and new aspects of power of the "New Labour"

Traditionally, Great Britain was building its policy relying on usual, historically determined attributes of the Kingdom's statehood:

➢ membership in the nuclear countries association;
➢ a position in the UN Safety Council;
➢ the "special relationship" with the USA;
➢ membership in the EU;
➢ membership in the NATO;
➢ the influence on countries of the Commonwealth (52 countries).

The end of the Cold War restored the very issues that had been on the agenda in the British government after the World War II. The government had to not only reconsider its role in life of the world's foreign policy but to analyze changes of international environment that related to the USA

becoming more influential, a globalization process in the EU, the emergence of a terrorist threat, etc. But the biggest question was connected with the "force basis" that had to be an essential principle of the new doctrine of the United Kingdom and its correlation with those principles and aspects of the society development which were inherent in the concept of the "third way". Because of this, the "new force aspects" were taken as a basis for the Blairism's foreign policy course, namely:

- ideological substantiation of international activity;
- institutional modernization of the British foreign policy;
- the rejection of well-established isolationist tendencies of the previous years;
- the overcoming of Euroscepticism and the European direction activation;
- moralism as a consequence of the international environment transformation;
- military strategy reconsideration;
- the idea of a "pivotal power".

Such changes resulted in the transformation of the above-mentioned attributes of statehood into the methods and instruments for the achievement of the state's foreign policy goals.

The annihilation of the main ideological enemy during the Cold War period caused a certain ideological vacuum the overcomingof which was the main purpose of the "New Labour". Tony Blair was trying to reconsider the new world order in the categories of the real politics that is based upon the principles of liberalism: freedom, democracy, justice and internationalism. In his opinion, the "third way" ideas implementation contributes to the economic stability and development which are, in their turn, based upon the use of the best practices and must defend interests of the citizens of both the state and the civil society which is based upon the mutual respect, decentralization, proper management and foreign policy based on the principles of the mutual respect and international cooperation (Blair 1998).

The fusion of the "three ways" of a further development of the state economy, the domestic and the foreign policy became a distinctive feature of the concept. The "first way" was based upon the principles of individualism, neoliberalism and Thatcherism. The "second way" was aimed at the governmentalized labourism. Finally, the "third way" which was eventually taken as a basis for the foreign policy concept had been based on the idea of the pursuit of a fair, based on the values of communitarianism social system (Blair 1998) which, it its turn, had been based upon the principles of liberal internationalism, human freedoms and rights supremacy.

The implementation of those ideas which were part of the program of the "New Labour" required reconsideration of certain institutional principles of the state foreign policy. He claims that working under globalizing conditions requires from the state to use a modern approachwhile resolving the issues of the foreign policy, first and foremost, it is a cooperation and a coordination within the key government institutions (Blair 1997).However, he means that the bureaucratic apparatus should be annihilated, and the role of the coordination process within the development and the acceptance of the foreign policy decisions in a closer cooperation between certain departments should be diminished.

First of all, it should be pointed out that the FCO's work is open and transparent. The work in this direction consisted of the following components: the establishment of the cooperation with non-state organizations that deal with the problems of human rights(for instance, Amnesty International), the support in establishing and operating the Foreign Policy Centre; the participation of highly skilled specialists in the work outside the institution of their expertise, the publication of the annual report concerning the human rights policy.

In his speech devoted to the FCO's new strategy establishment announcement, Robin Cook, focused on the necessity to qualitatively fulfill the tasks that were a part of the foreign policy and to create a proper image of the state within the global community (Cook 1997). The priority was also to work together with other countries to resolve crucial global issues (for example, counter-terrorism, anti-drug war, war against the escalation of weapons of mass destruction and so on).

R. Cook (1997)repeatedly said:"The Labour Government will put human rights at the heart of our foreign policy" T. Blair (1999) told that the sovereignty did not give to rogue countries the right to violate human rights and to commit crimes against humanity. The regulations that are stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have become those that are essential for every country (Human Rights Annual Report 2000. UK HouseofCommonsForeignAffairsCommittee, FirstReport. (Session 2000-200), unanimouslyagreedbytheCommitteeonJanuary 23 2001.).

Certainly, previous governments had already tried to actualize the issues of human rights protection before, but the "new Laborists" considered these issues according to the state national interests. Thus, Tony Blair was trying to draw the community's attention to the "butterfly effect" in the international activity, when one country's policy has an impact on a policy of another country which is located on the opposite side of the world.

One more important aspect of the "new force" is the actualization of the European cooperation vector on the agenda. The algorithm of policy in this direction was characterized by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Stephen Byers (2000: 45), as reasonable, pragmatic and corresponding with state national interests. In this respect, a specific model of the EU reformation is implied, according to the very interests of Great Britain. An important feature of the EU reformation approach should be the assertion of necessity not only to proclaim the "European political values but to defend them when they are in danger". In this context, London intended to actively influence the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy formation. This, in London's opinion, creates a harmony in the EU and the NATO cooperation that complies with another strategic purpose of Great Britain concerning the EU – to forge close links between the EU and the USA.

The main idea of the cooperation with the EU was to return the decision making process to the national level. The British model of the EU reformation was aimed to combine the rising influence of the EU in the world as an independent geopolitical pole and the thorough attitude towards the national identity of all the members of the Union.

While working with the EU countries, the issues of the European and the international security and the implementation of the above-mentioned principle of the human rights protection into this system become relevant.

These ideas that were embodied in the British concept called the "Principles of International Law" and intended to be the basis of the new rules of cooperation on the international arena and new methods of the international institutions organization, came from the principle of globalization of not only the international economy but also from politics and the area of security. The latter should not allow the self-isolation and proclamation of any national spheres to belong purely to the state internal affairs.

However, the apologists of the above-mentioned concept do not comprehend its logic. They admit that the main support of the order in the world where the "law and international cooperation are in power" is the UN, and they call non-interference into a country's domestic affairs the most important principle of the international law. In April 1999 Tony Blair said: "One state should not feel it has the right to change the political system of another or foment subversion or seize pieces of territory to which it feels it should have some claim".

Along with that, the idea of not using the non-interference principle arises in certain "important relationships" among which acts of genocide, oppression that cause a mass flow of refugees and destabilize situation in neighboring countries and even a minority government rule that is not legitimate. All these cases are considered to be a threat to the international security and peace; thus, in this case, the external interference is justified. Taking these ideas into account, the decision-making procedure in the UN and, especially, in the Safety Council should be reconsidered. The main point of the "New Labour'" doctrine in the sphere of foreign policy is the promotion of the activity within this organization requiring its complete modernization. Changing the decision-making procedure in the

Safety Council is the main reform. The essence of London's position lies in the cancellation of the veto right and the approval of decisions by a majority vote.

Adjusting a lot of aspects of his predecessors' foreign policy doctrine, T. Blair remains not only an adherent of the "special relationship" but the one who is seeking to enlarge the role of the USA in the European countries. He is one of those western activists who openly claim that the USA can act where they think their interference is necessary.

The next important feature of the essence of the "New Labour'" doctrine that comes from their concept of the "third way" is a demand to hardly deal with the regimes that encroach upon the human rights, democracy and nomocracy in their countries. In relation to this concept, London also developed new rules to control arms exports and contributed to the passage of the EU's "Code of Conduct on Arms Exports" in 1998.

One of the key principles of the British Labourists' foreign policy is a military potential of Great Britain, especially nuclear weapons. On the level of the nuclear missile potential in the west Britain is on the second place after the USA. Its "special relationship" with the latter is largely based on the close cooperation in the nuclear missile sphere. Britain's military doctrines in the second half of the twentieth century were always known for their quite a high level of determination.

In their time, the Labouristsopposed to the use of the American nuclear missile complexes "Trident-2" by the English submarines and demanded to remove American cruise missiles out of the country. "New Labour" having come to power introduced a new military doctrine. In July, in 1998 a new government program of the armed forces development called the "Strategic Defense Review" was introduced. It implied the implementation of a series of measures regarding the strategic nuclear power and the power of general use. They were aimed to change the structure, quantity and refurbishment to increase the national armed forcescapabilities in the fulfillment of tactical missions.This program is the result of the government's reconsideration of the defense policy that was caused by the changes of the international situation and the desire to strengthen the role of the United Kingdom in the global community. The purpose of the reconstruction is not only to resolve problems that have appeared in the context of a new geopolitical situation but also to allow the British government to promptly and adequately respond to those problems that can appear in the 21st century.

As a result, the main purpose of the program was to develop a concept of making modern and efficient forces that would be quite flexible in terms of adaptation to anticipated changes. The priority isthe safety, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, national interests' protection both on the global scale and in separate regions by means of the active participation in peacemaking operations and military diplomacy.

It is assumed that in the foreseeable future the largest-scale operation where Great Britain's armed forces are to participate will be regional conflicts.

The new Labour government continues the tradition of its predecessors who paid much attention to the English defense intelligence development. The government always assigned the biggest tasks to the defense intelligence seeing in it the most important instrument and the basis for the accomplishment of its goals in the sphere of the global policy. Tony Blair proved the fairness of this principle one more time, having developed and introduced the program for this department development. This program is aimed at reinforcing the security intelligence service and developing a firm public opinion about the special services as the main guarantors of the national security. The service is directly supervised by the Prime Minister.

The idea of a "pivotal power" is a kind of a consolidating component of the new Labourist ideological root of Blair's government foreign policy. T. Blair himself defines a pivotal power as a country that "is at the crux of the alliances that shape the world and its future" (Little, Wickham-Jones 2000: 19).With the help of the idea of a "pivotal power" he was trying to avoid a connected with the real politic term the "great global state" and, at the same time, to show the role of Great Britain not

only as one of the "middle powers", especially implying its economic, military capacity and the status of a permanent member in the UN Safety Council.Under the alliances that "organize the world and its future" and the core of which is Great Britain, chiefly the NATO and the EU are implied. The "pivotal" international position of the country explains the importance of such a foreign policy goal, as "building a bridge" between the USA and Europe after the Cold War. Besides, the public opinion inside the country and the international community are thus preparing for the following conclusion: certain types of countries have not only the right but the liability for intervention (of course, meaning the liberal interventionism).

Atlanticism

The "special relationship" with the USA or the policy of "Atlanticism", as it is stated above, has remained the main approach of the United Kingdom's foreign policy since the end of the World War II. Some historians (Dickie 1994)think that with the end of the Cold War, the "special relationship" had to disappear, as the idea of fighting against communism was no longer relevant. However, "the New Labour" reconsidered this concept and, as a result, the idea of a "transatlantic bridge", where Great Britain had to play the role of an element that would unite Europe and the USA came into existence.

This idea began to develop after T. Blair's speech in 1997 when he emphasized: "Our aim should be to deepen our relationship with the US at all levels. We are the bridge between the US and Europe. Let us use it."In 1998 T. Blair said: "I know that some feel that being close with the United States is an inhibition on closer European cooperation. On the contrary, I believe it is essential that the isolationist voices in the United States are kept at bay and we encourage our American allies to be our partners in issues of world peace and security."The Prime Minister always stressed the historical affinity between the USA and Great Britain and stated that the Euroscepticism was not in keeping with the national interests. He underlined the Kingdom's reluctance to constantly trying to choose a partner in the foreign policy, speaking about the Great Britain's power in the EU as part of its partnership with the USA and the EU's interest in the cooperation with Great Britain due to its great influence on the continent (The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Tony Blaire of the United Kingdom. May 29, 1997).Using such statements, he was, in a certain way, trying to gain the Europe's support concerning the question of the triangle Brussels – London – Washington interrelations development, and also to reduce the "pressure" that had accumulated over the Cold War period: "Britain does not need to choose between being strong in Europe or being close to the United States of America", "by being strong in Europe we will further strengthen our relations with the US" (Kampfner 2004:97).

Conducting such a policy resulted in meeting with a number of obstacles both of the internal and the external character:

➢ the United States' inclination to conduct a unilateral and unagreedpolicy at the end of 1990's and the beginning of 2000's.
➢ contradictions inside the party and the government regarding the necessity of the "Atlantic" policy vector actualization and strengthening;
➢ the lack of the common point of view concerning the concept of the "transatlantic bridge" among the chief European partners;
➢ economic and ideological tension between the EU and the USA.

The collapse of the Soviet threat marked the beginning of the economic and ideological rivalry between the EU and the USA, a unilateral Washington's foreign policy strategy and also an increased number of mutual suspicions. These tendencies in the policy were observed in the conflict resolution in Kosovo, in the policy against Saddam Hussein and in Afghanistan, in the activity of the International Court of Justice, in the US ignoring the agreement about antipersonnel mines, in the difficulties of signing the Kyoto Protocol and in other issues being on the agenda at that time.

The USA's promotion of the anti-missile defense including the termination of the 1972 year agreement irritates the Europeans more. West European leaders become more oppressed by the unification of the neoconservatives and aggressive realists in the Bush's administration. The Foreign Secretary of England, Jack Straw, characterized John Bolton, the Under Secretary of State and a consistent adherent of the "Americanization of foreign policy" as "terrible".Only the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, was, in the opinion of Europe, committed to the cause of the multilateral cooperation.

The first Bush's trip to Europe in June 2001 ostentatiouslydoes not include a visit to Great Britain: the American president gives preference to the "bridge to Latin America" visiting Spain first before the "Atlantic bridge". The trip did not break the tension of transatlantic relationships, moreover, Bush made it clear that new ideas in Europe were coming from the East comparing "old" and "new" Europe. Though, the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, made it even clearer.

However, in spite of such problems, T. Blair continued to develop the "transatlantic bridge" policy line as a tradition that had already become popular in Churchill's time. The United Kingdom seemed to be happy with the policy that combined a pro-European direction and a certain criticism of Washington in the sphere of economy and ecology.

However, Blair meets with serious contradictions inside his own party because of the support of the United States concerning the anti-missile defense. The Foreign Minister, Peter Hein, for instance, publicly criticized the program at the beginning of 2001.

The representative of the Liberal Democrats' party for Foreign Affairs, Shirley Williams, urged Blair to condemn the USA's drift towards unilateralism which threatened a vulnerable network of multilateral agreements and the arms control mechanism that had been keeping peace between nuclear countries for fifty years. The USA's tough policy regarding the European defense integration worried the British Prime Minister, even though he was consistent with the NATO being a core of the European defense. In the middle of 2001, Washington virtually renounced the position of unilateralism. Some propositions concerning a participatory development of anti-missile technologies were made, and the multilateral negotiations concerning the North Korean nuclear program were renovated.Some experts connect the Washington's consent to the Russia-NATO Council with Tony Blair's influence(Young 2002).In an extremely important interview published in "Time" magazine in September 10, 2001, the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, stated: "You can't be a unilateralist; the world is too complicated".

A breaking point of the "bridge" idea development was the events of September 11, 2001 that radically transformed the international environment and the ideological basis of the USA's foreign policy. The priority of the agenda was counter-terrorism and the calls for the necessity to defend liberal values and democracy. Aloofness, isolationism and unilateral actions were replaced with the search for new partners and the international environment reformation under the principle supporter of democracy / supporter of terrorism. American military domination in order to promote democracy becomes the most crucial issue.

London's response was fast and expressed firm solidarity with a new counter-terrorist coalition. As Timothy Garton Ash (2005:49) put it: "Churchill's alarm bells are triggered".Blair sent a letter to Washington with propositions concerning the counter-terrorist response underlining multilateralism, intelligence service cooperation not excluding the use of military power. He demonstrates an extraordinary diplomatic activity and skills. In a few days, individual aspects of the "special relationship" are included; the British Prime Minister becomes a welcome guest in Washington among the foreign leaders. When Blair's opponents compared him with an American ambassador, theassessment of, first of all, the attempts to explain the intention of the United States and, most importantly, to remain allies within the context of multilateral policy was more precise.

Tony Blair's response motivation is complicated; it consists of several important components. First, it is a problem of the "Atlantic bridge". Critics of Blair's policy were pessimistic about the

realization of this idea. This pessimism was vividly explained by the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, stating that the bridge traffic is chiefly one-way. However, he undoubtedly thought of himself as an inspirer of the transatlantic unity at that time. Second, it is the analogy with "Greeks and Romans" meaning the rise of Great Britain's influence on the United States.

Robin Cook, the former Foreign Secretary, found it necessary to maintain proximity with America; his successor Jack Straw called the USA's strength an objective fact that should have been admitted, and the Great Britain's priority goal was to assist in the reasonable use of this strength.Blair also thought that stepping aside or criticizing Bush is irresponsible, and it means giving impulse to the American unilateralism. Blair was trying to direct the American power towards the multilateralism and to expand the agenda for its usage including issues about the conflicts resolution of in the Middle East and even the poverty in Africa.

The last but not the least was the factor of Tony Blair's ability to convince, at the same time,concerning, first of all, international relationships and world order transformation rather than the British-American relationships. Time and again Blair underlined that the 9/11 events had changed the world, and the world community had to change its attitude to it. In the opinion of T. Blair and his numerous contemporaries, the inefficiency of international efforts regarding the genocide in Rwanda and Balkan terrors at the beginning of 1990 stimulated the emergence of a new type of liberal interventional internationalism after the end of the Cold War.

There is an opinion that having taken the sides with the USA, Blair virtually consolidated the separation into two camps. The essence of the differences no one concealed either in Paris or in Berlin: the Americans wanted to rule the world by themselves, whereas the Europeans stood out for the multipolar system. There are two most widespread interpretations of Blair's motives in supporting Bush in Afghanistan and Iraq. The first one is: a certain "upfront payment" for future benefits as part of the "special relationship". The second one is: the support of the United States as a consequence of common values and interests, and also the British leader's true faith in the rightness of such a policy. The second interpretation is quite often considered naive and prevents from getting full profit from being interested in the British support. The former British Ambassador to Moscow, Roderick Braithwaite, expressed it in a more explicit form. He thinks that Blair had to insist on a certain "payback" for assisting Bush in Afghanistan and, especially, in Iraq and also to demonstrate willingness to end the support in case Britain would not receive these "bonuses". He also expresses his regret that countries' leaders and politicians do not like to resort to such an instrument of pressure as a demonstration of willingness to abandon the negotiating table (Braithwaite 2003).

Kendall Meyers, the US State Department Officer, expresses other doubts in the possibility to influence the United States policy.In his public lecture entitled "How special is the United States-United Kingdom relationship after Iraq?" and conducted in Johns Hopkins University in November 2006, Meyers says that during the time of preparation to the war in Iraq, Donald Rumsfeld, the United States Secretary of Defense, expressed the opinion that the USA could have carried out the intrusion without the Britain's help. K. Meyers even writes about a certain "shame" for such a treatment to the ally, particularly, to Tony Blair, but points out that he did not notice any kind of gratitude or reciprocity on the American's side. Moreover, the Britain's opinion was quite often ignored and not paid attention to.

The European direction

The attempt to implement the concept of the "transatlantic bridge" and also to define itself as a leading European country caused the necessity to develop the European direction of collaboration. Before 1997, T. Blair did not conceal his opinion concerning the necessity to reinforce the European integration. Shortly after he had assumed the office, he signed the Amsterdam Treaty and the Social Chapter of the European Union Treaty – the documents that his predecessor, John Major, refused to

sign. Such steps were determined by his speech where he said: "We cannot shape Europe if we do not matter to Europe" (Labour Party, New Labour: Because Britain deserve better, P.4.).

T. Blair strongly supported the European policy of Britain (the Franco-British declaration in Saint-Malo, the support of the idea about the EU expansion and the participation in drawing up the Lisbon agenda). However, during the second tenure, his policy had a more impetuous character.

In 1998 T. Blair announced about the "steps of change" in the policy concerning the EU. First, he demanded that all the secretaries, deputies and officers got in contact with their colleagues in other countries of the Union. The idea was to better understand how the officials from other countries understand European problems giving a strategic advantage in the negotiations. But instead of making a firm connections network, this idea was being realized according to the principle of the "disorderly bilateral relations" with the countries that had similar interests in certain issues as Great Britain. Some cases made the critics assert that that principle was rather negative than positive as in every matter, Great Britain had an ally that would help obstruct the progress. Even in those cases when the cooperation had a vividly expressed positive shade, for example, the Saint-Malo Declaration regarding the European defense where Great Britain was looking for the issues that it could solve being outside the integration. In this regard, Ann Dayton (2002: 725) says that "after assuming the office, he (Blair) was obsessed with the idea of the European and the global leadership of Great Britain… But this role will be always difficult to play, and the initiatives in the sphere of defense gave Blair the opportunity to run projects in Europe".

Nicole Gnesoto (2000: 5) spoke about a shift in the British approach towards the defense policy from a complete denial of its involvement to an assertion of the idea of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This was the first step on a road of breaking political barriers on the issue of anti-crisis management.

Alongside with the Prime Minister of Spain, José María Aznar, Blair made a great contribution to the developmentof the Lisbon Agenda. Working with the leaders of the countries and governments,he managed to gain support from other countries-members of the EU regarding numerous British projects connected with the economy. As a result, a new strategic objective for the EU was determined – to become the most competitive and dynamically developing, based on the world's experience and capable of providing the increase in workplaces and social projects. The basic approaches for the achievement of this goal lied in the idea of the "open method of coordination" which was based on the interactive learning, benchmarking and adoption of the world's best practices. Although this ambitious project stalled in the course of time, the fact remains –Great Britain has contributed much to the EU's agenda that is currently in effect.

On October 6, 2000, T. Blair's "Warsaw speech" in the Poland's stock exchange became a certain response to the discussion concerning the developing countries and the future of Europe which had been opened up earlier that year by the Foreign Minister of Germany, Joschka Fischer. In his speech, he underlined that it was important for Great Britain to play a full role in the EU: "Britain has a powerful economy, an obvious role in defense and foreign policy and there is a genuine respect for Britain's political institutions and stability. Also, in a world moving closer together, with new powers emerging, our strength with the United States is not just a British asset; it is potentially a European one. Britain can be the bridge between the EU and the US. Britain's future is and will be as a leading partner in Europe".

On the other side, the new Labourists contributed a little to reform, in some degree, the anti-European communities inside their country, presumably being afraid of the countermeasures from the Eurosceptics and the mass media. Eursceptics inside the party were disappointed by T. Blair's reluctance to take the initiative on the issues of the common currency, and also they were worried about the way the party held the elections to the European Parliament in 1999. The voter turnout for the elections dropped by 25%, and the Conservative Party got more seats than the Liberal Party.

In their election manifesto, the new Labourists made the following assessment of the 1997 pledges: "The Labourists gave Britain the leadership in Europe which Britain and Europe needed"; "The Liberal Party successfully carried out the negotiations between Great Britain and Europe. Our interests are protected… We carried out the negotiations about the European economic reforms and the European defense capacity development the key to which was in the NATO" (Labour Party, Ambitions for Britain: Labours manifesto 2001: 44). However,the party's inclination towards the USA was also traced: "We were and will be the USA's ally, but we will not turn away from Europe as the Conservatives did".

A new phase in the British-American relations began after the events of September 11, 2001. Although the EU-15 group supported Washington as well as Great Britain, the special relationship of the latter with the USA cast a shadow on the newly found European status by Britain. Thus, during the whole second tenure of Labourists was pervaded with arguments inside the EU and the commitment to the transatlantic relations.

Great Britain was willing to support the United States in the military sphere, mainly with the UN mandate. France and Germany were against such measures. After J. Chirac had stated that France would impose a veto on the decision about the beginning of the military operation, Great Britain gave the United States its full support for the Intrusion resulting in the Anglo-American military operation that wasdisapprovedmostly by the EU.Thus, the USA's relationships with France and Germany were broken, and the relationships between the latter and Great Britain were damaged. In his speeches, J. Chirac repeatedly mentioned the Great Britain's disruption of the EU's policy and values. However, Great Britain was supported by Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Spain and Italy.

Yet, the fact that the country demonstrated its adherence to Atlanticism, and the USA's Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld, included it into the list of the "new Europe" (i.e. those that supported the USA), it became difficult to play Europe's card as in the period of the first Labourists' tenure.

T. Blair's relations with the "old Europe" were spoiled after the so-called "chocolate summit" where France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg had been trying to create the European military core that would have been able to competewith NATO. Their efforts were reflected in a German newspaper entitled "Frankfurter Rundschau" as a beginning of the "new era of the European defense policy". Saint-Malo seemed to be a long time ago and now the role of Great Britain in the defense policy was considerably restricted.

The next stumbling question was the EU's constitution project.

The new Labourists demonstrated good skills in the use of international connections so that to consolidate their fixed tenure in the position of the President of the European Council. And here they gained full support from France and Germany. As for other issues, Great Britain did not gain any support after announcing its position on the matter of taxation, criminal law, foreign policy, social policy and defense policy, i.e. in those spheres where it was not ready lose its national veto right.

On the whole, the ultimate variant of the agreement was considered by the majority as a victory of Great Britain, even though the Conservatives and the mass media still regarded it as a "federal document" that would erode British sovereignty.

Conclusion

The ideological basis of theBlairist foreign policy model was laid in the concepts of Winston Churchill and Margaret Thatcher. The former created the idea of the Britain's "three majestic circles" on the international arena; the latter emphasized the British-American relationship along with the intention to maintain a certain balance between the European and the Atlantic vectors and also introduced some ideas of moralism and ethics as an indispensable component of the modern foreign policy.The Cold War created a foundation for the "traditional force" of Britain's foreign policy that was transferred by Tony Blair from the factors that had an impact on the country's foreign policy

course establishment into the tools for the completion of the tasks set on the international arena. The concept of the "three majestic circles" was transformed by means of shifting the accent from the "equal" distribution of efforts for the participation in the affairs of all the vectors to Atlanticism, as the basic principle, Eurocentrism, as the priority, and collaboration, as a tradition. In its turn, M. Thatcher's moralism was incorporated in the Blairism by means of the "global interaction" idea establishment. Moralism and ethics played the crucial role in the Blairist foreign policy modeland served as its ideological basis despite the unusual for the Labourists tactics to useharsh methodsto complete the task. Therefore, conceptually, it is the vindication of the necessity to build the ethical foreign policy based upon the principle of social responsibility and the human rights protection that was the purpose of Tony Blair's government. The idea of "liberal interventionism" and of the necessity for "crusades" for the sake of the liberal values protection became a certain quintessence of the two above-mentioned approaches.

A similar vector resulted from the necessity to reconsider a newly created after the Cold War world order and the necessity to be in keeping with the national interests and the definite country's priorities. At the same time, the British policy's worldview of the time was formed through the prism of substitution ofthe "global safety/global policy"notion for the"international safety/international policy" notion.

The "special relationship" with the USA was chosen as one of the main aspects of the ideological basis. The crucial idea in the given context was the idea of the "transatlantic bridge" or the "pivotal power" between the United States and the United Europe. Such an interpretation required from the country to start the activity in both directions simultaneously preserving its national interests. Therefore, despite his devotion to the idea of integration with Europe, Tony Blair was trying to stand up for the necessity for the state-centrism but not for the overnationalism or collectivism in the EU.

References:

1. Baiers, Stiven. (2000). The Third Way. *International live.* Vol. 12. pp. 41-49.
2. Blair, Tony (1999). Doctrine of the International Community. [online: accessed 2010-03-24.]. Available from WWW: http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1297.
3. Blair, Tony. (1998). TheThirdWay: NewPoliticsfor a NewCentury. London: Fabian Society.
4. Blair, Tony. (2006). A GlobalAllianceforGlobalValues. [online: accessed 2011-10-19]. Available from WWW: http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/798.pdf.
5. Blair, Tony. (2006). Clash about civilizations. [online: accessed 2010-03-13]. Available from WWW: http://web.archive.org/web/20070205110636/www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page9224.asp.
6. Blake, Robert; Louis William Roger. (1993). Churchill. A Major New Assessment of His Life in Peace and War. W. W. Norton & Company.
7. Bllair, Tony. (1999). PrimeMinister's speech: Doctrine of the International Community at the Economic Club, Chicago. [online: accessed 2013-05-17]. Available from WWW: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international-jan-june99-blair_doctrine4-23/.
8. Braithwaite, Rodric. (2003). End of the War. [online: accessed 2011-04-23]. Available from WWW: https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/end-of-special-relationship-america-britain.
9. Coker, Christopher. (2003). Foreign and defense policy. Hollowell, Jonathan. Britain Since 1945. Edited by Jonathan Hollowell. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
10. Cook, Robin. (1997). Speech on the government's ethical foreign policy. [online: accessed 2012-10-27] Available from WWW: https://www.theguardian.com/world/1997/may/12/indonesia.ethicalforeignpolicy.

11. Dickie, John. (1994). Special No More: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality. London: George Weidenfeld& Nicholson.

12. Dumbrell, John. (2006). Special Relationship. Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq. New-York: Palgrave Macmillan.

13. English, Richard; Kenny Michael. (1999). British decline or the politics of declinism? *British Journal of Politics and International Relations.* Vol. 1, no. 2. pp. 252-266.

14. Fry, Geoffrey. (2005). The Politics of Decline. An Interpretation of British Politics from the 1940s to the 1970s. New-York: Palgrave Macmillan.

15. Garton Ash, Timothy. (2005). Free World. America, Europe and the Surprising Future of the West. London: Vintage.

16. Giddens, Antony. (1998). The Third Way. The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.

17. Hollowell, Jonathan. (2003). Britain Since 1945. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

18. Kampfner, John. (2004). Blair's Wars. London: Simon & Schuster UK; New Ed edition (7 Jun. 2004).

19. Pearson, Jonatan. (2003). Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis. Reluctant Gamble. London: Palrgave Macmillan.

20. Shlaim, Avi. (1975). Britain's quest for a world role. *International Relations*. Vol. 5. pp. 838-856.

21. Thatcher, Margaret. (2003). Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World. New-York: HarperCollins.

22. Wickham-Jones, M. 2000 *New Labour's Foreign Policy: a new moral crusade?.* Little, R. & Wickham-Jones, M. (eds.). Manchester University Press.

23. Young, Hugo. (2002). This Good Cop, Bad Cop RoutineisWorking – So Far. [online: accessed 2014-03-06]. Available from WWW: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2002/oct/22/britainand911.foreignpolicy.