DIMENSIONS OF HUMANISM AS A VALUE

Miloslava Yankova

Senior Assistant, PhD
in Theory of Education and Didactics (Social Pedagogy)
at Konstantin Preslavsky – University of Shumen

BULGARIA
mila60@mail.bg

ABSTRACT: This text presents basic ideas of humanism as a value. Delineated the historical aspects of the theme. Emphasis is placed on its modern dimensions. Also are consider forms of humanism as charity, compassion, justice, love, and primarily love to the neighbor, friendship, sociality, peace, responsibility for the others. They are represented by the thoughts of philosophers like Davidsan, Levinas and Ricoeur

KEY WORDS: Value, humanism, charity, compassion, mercy, justice, love, love to the neighbor, sociality, peace, friendship and responsibility to the others.

Value which pierces all forms of communication and developing human spirit and have pronounced moral aspect is humanism. The concept of humanism as corresponding to our nature behavior creates stoic Panaetius. As a value and moral principle humanism means respect for the individual, respect for human dignity, creating appropriate conditions for human life.

The essence of the Christian understanding is found in the sermons of Jesus Christ and the Epistles of St. Paul. Thus, in the first address to the people of Galilee Jesus begins with the Annunciation (promises bliss to the meek, the merciful, the peacemakers). In his epistles in the temple of Jerusalem, He says that after Judgement in the kingdom of God can stop only those who entered with love for someone in trouble man.

The problem for man, for his freedom and the possibilities for its development is essential during the New Times. The sofor J. Bruno Fr. Bacon and B.Spinoza the man is "crown of nature center of the building of the world". A high point in the development of humanism are the views and activities of the French enlightenment and the French materialists of the 18th century. - Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, Holbach and Helvetius. They see in the human being purpose of human activity.

Humanistic essence of Kant's moral philosophy sounds in the second formulation of the categorical imperative. In it the value of the human person in the face of the individual and of humanity as a whole is built to the rank of supreme moral law: moral law: "Do so that you use the humanity, both in his person and in the person of any other always as an goal, never only as a means." [1, 83] Ricoeur believes that the second formula of the categorical imperative specifying ancient golden rule, introducing the idea of humanity - humanity in my person and the other persons - an idea that is a particular and if we can say, historical form of the autonomy." [2,131-132]
As Sartre argues in existentialism the engaged and the selecting man is responsible. He is responsible not only for himself but for all mankind. Who chooses for himself, he chooses for all. By acting in a certain way we are showing to the world our vision of how to act to the every one and what kind must be his value system.

Existentialism is not humanism, which raises man in cult. This is humanism, according to which no other universe except human. This humanism reminds people besides him there is no other legislator. He decides and is responsible for himself. The realization of the individual is not to escape in you as life in inactivity. Man realized as a person who looking for a permanent purpose outside itself and this goal is a release, a concrete implementation.

A form of humanism is charity (philanthropy). She appeared in imperial Rome. Immediate reason for its occurrence is the misery of the free citizens, who despising the productive labor. The State and the wealthy citizens are forced to feed this mass destitute of people.

The charity is an essential part of the lifestyle of a Christian. Christian Church unites the hungry plebeian masses in consumer communities.

French Revolution with a special decree of 1793 declares the alms as crime. A similar is attitude to the charity after the October Revolution.

The charity reflects the level of humanization of society starting from the premise that all people have a right to happiness. If you do not show the necessary tact and goodwill leads to posters of possibilities of an awareness of their own nullity of the personality. The aimless charity can lead to corrupting impact both on those who produce it and on those who accept an aims.

Charity in Donald Davidson confirms the central role of caritas, charity. [3, 150] Davidson, as Levinas and Jürgen Habermas are with more open to caritas theories. The friendship can become the principle, factor of truth only after the thought abandon all claims to objective, universal, apodiktik foundation. Without authentic openness to the being as event Levinas’ the other in always runs the risk to be seeing dethroned by the Other with a capital letters.

The christian sermon on charity is not only or not so ethical or an enlightening consequence from disclosure of "objective" truth about our nature like children of God. Rather, it is an appeal, which departs from the historical fact of the incarnation (as a constitutive rather than "actual" fact).

The truth as caritas, charity and the being as an event are two interrelated aspects. The central role of the Other in many contemporary philosophical theories acquires all its meaning, if you locate in the context of the collapse of metaphysics. Only under this condition may avoid the risk of a moralism who only teach and completely "pragmatic" ("for preference is to live in world of friends ... "). [3, 151]

According to Andre Comte Sponvil the moral progress is the only human progress whose infinity is guaranteed. The guarantee comes from the ability of man to be more humane than he is. As thinker he is "humane, but never in sufficient degree "[4, 11]

This immanent, eternal lack of humanity dooms a man fore ever to be morally responsible and the ethics - always be an infinite, eternal unfinished project for the human future as possible only through more humanity.
LEVINAS tries to connect justice, starting from the charity and what it seems infinite obligation to the other and in this sense, comes to his personal uniqueness, and therefore love. For the philosopher this defines love that is devoid of any lust. Precisely as such, it is initially obligation for many people and alone is recompense for justice.

LOVE is not selfish; her name is justice. It does not bind human beings, which have already been connected. For French philosopher Levinas everything becomes human, can’t remain confined to "my place under the sun."

The French postmodern philosopher sees in the love of neighbor the primordial sociality, the human proximity in the opening his home for the Foreigner, who is knocking to the door, in empathy to the Other to the extent to prove his hospitality - to part with his calmness for him, to be his host, selflessly to meet him, to take for his responsibility and care. In this line of thinking human in a man is the ability to go beyond the existence, to the transcendence of himself to the Other and in the work for the Other. [5, 7,8]

If the individuality is the true face of reason, it is an apology, i.e. conversation with the Other. The subjectivity at least cannot accept to keep silent - mutinied against the violence of the mind, leading the apology to silent, to the denial of themselves and (in without coercion) to a suspension of the apology. This would be love. Love has no other name than that of a person. Here person enjoys a privilege - love is directed towards the Other, to the friend, to the child, to the favorite being, to the parents. The love that as transcendence is directed at another, throws us into the very immanence. Love draws movement in which one seeks that in which has been connected before it undertook the search, although finds him in the Exteriority. [5, 210,211]

The right, given the difference from the Other, which in no- indifference is not normal, insufficient and reciprocal otherness of many individuals in the kin, and the unique otherness, which is outside the whole kin, unique that transcends kin. This is the transcendence that is the irreducible superiority of the sociality, which in the nearness is himself peace. The calmness, which already is itself a not-indifferent. The calmness, where by not-indifferent must understand that responsibility is "for-others". The answer is the primordial goodness that the hatred already suggests its attention. The answer is love without lust, where human rights receive attention - the right to love, ie the unique dignity.

The proximity in a man meaning just increased the sociality based on all the loneliness in which he resides the knowledge of individuals scattered in its kind. Increase of the sociality in the love. In the ethical peace the attitude goes toward an non-assimilable incomparable Other, he irreducible toward the Other, to the Other unique. Only the unique is absolutely Other. But the uniqueness of the unique is the uniqueness of the beloved. The uniqueness of the unique sense gets in love. Love as a logical action!

The third wrests me by the proximity of the Other, far from the responsibility prior to every judgment away from the presupposed responsibility for his neighbour in his immediacy of unique and incomparable, far from the original sociality. This is the hour of justice. Love of neighbour and its primordial right to be unique and incomparable to which I must to answer itself comes to appeal to the mind able to compare incomparable to become the wisdom of love.

The extravagance of the nobility of "because of-the-others" the infinity his, is led into a common measure. Here primary human right, namely the right of uniqueness, insists or a
verdict of and therefore of objectivity. This law, institutions need which suing and political authority that supports them. [6, 4]

Levinas recognizes that it Buber led him to capture with a phenomenology of the sociality, which he said was the best of human. [7, 116] In the otherness face for the Other - my I command. The philosopher sees the aim in foundation of justice which close the face at the obligations in respect of the person an emergency exteriority to the face.

The sociability is this otherness of the person on the other-that asks me. This is a voice that rises in me before any verbal expression. This voice is order, it ordered me to answer for the life of the other person. This makes meeting the creature which is appears in person, the ethical event of the sociality.

The peace as a link with an otherness, irreducible to a common genus makes this otherness only relative otherness. In the ethical peace there is a connection with another which cannot be assimilated with irreducible another, with the only one.

The question that asked the French philosopher is whether peace is not brotherly form to close proximity to the Other, which would not be simply the failure of coincidence with the Other, but would mean growth of the sociality and the love. The greatness and the importance of responsibility, are an expression of sociality. Meeting the creature appearing in the person is ethical event of sociality. [5, 168,169]

The only oneness to only one is the only oneness of the loved. The only oneness to only one means in love.

According to Levinas hence the peace is seen as love. This does not mean that the be thought of as a subjective illusion to which is in love. In the impenetrable essence of the substance and through rigor in its logical forms and their kinds, and through the violence of its persistence in the being the subjective is the breakthrough to the only one, to the absolute to the Other, in the name of love, immediate human intimacy and peace.

Oneness is the only oneness of love. The peace as a link with the other in his logically indistinguishable otherness cannot be reduced to a logical identity of the final difference, adding to a genus. But peace for Levinas can be considered as a constant warning of this otherness. The peace of the close proximity is responsibility of my I to the Other, the inability to leave him in his solitude before the mystery of death. The postmodern thinker concludes that peace with the other leads to the ability to die for it. In this expresses the seriousness of love of neighbor, love, devoid of any lust.

In the peace of love of neighbor it comes to placing always questioned their identity, and its unlimited freedom and its power. Positive definition of love of neighbor is distinct from any eroticism and lust. Love without lust itself sociality.

Responsibility means the superiority immediate vicinity in ethical sociality in its lust devoid of love. In boundless responsibility that one can never be free and that has not abated until the last breath of his neighbor, according to the French thinker, "undoubtedly kept secret of sociality", whose total justification, even if it is ultimately futile "is called love neighbor, love without any lust. " [7, 51]

That, says Levinas, is the distance of the proximity, the miracle of social connection. In this vrazka difference between me and my other remains. It is supported by denying in close proximity, which is also because distance no-no-difference of one to the other, as a non-
indifference between relatives. Being affected by the otherness of the other Levinas expressed by the term "brotherhood." [7, 107]

The first question in human is a matter of justice. Indestructible responsibility for each other and if you can ignore the uniqueness of the person and love. Justice is the foundation of conscience. Objectivity is based on justice. As expressive expressed over the French philosopher of extravagant generosity for-other is superimposed a reasonable, menial or angelic order of justice through knowledge and philosophy here is measure presented in the infinity of being-for-other of peace and closeness and wisdom of love. Love is the emotion based society for all, through desires and achievements. Postmodern paradigm associated with love attitude towards Druten, while the relationship is strong reciprocal.

Thus, for Levinas love in the true sense of the word is an expression of responsibility for others. This is love, compassion, in which dominates the ethical moment, ie responsibility is understood as the ability to take on the fate of others, until the final gift - to die for others. Love is a relationship between individuals who retain the otherness of the other. Love must ensure fairness, so that her Catholic probabilism not turn against compassion - compassion and empathy to the suffering people. Justice and charity that as interconnected in ethical terms, characterize the perfection of sociality, the limits of responsibility for others. In real life they may oppose.

In the institution and by dispensing, ethical aspiration is valid for all that as third parties remain outside the game of friendship or love. This allows for the formation of the category of "everyone" whose content is nothing at all, but a partner in a distribution system. In this sense, justice is expressed in the award of each of its share. This means that every th is the address of any equitable. From this position, the argument of the philosopher to consider the fairness in ethical plan is entered in the pursuit of the good life and its relationship to friendship to the other. French philosopher analyze justice as strongly distinguishes it from friendship. Thus stored under direct contact, whilst still room for this without any person. This possibility becomes "another" "everyone" as far as the rules of our language together unlimited number of people, but only a minor part of them intervene in terms of friendship. Thus, in another term Rikaor articulate ideas through another and everyone. Or as expressing posmoderniyat thinker "Another friendship and each of justice." [3, 56]

For Rikaor is essential to clarify how the rules for "full in justice institutions life," suggesting reciprocity, to combine with the preaching of Christ in human relations the unilateral love. [3, 132] The friendship introduces the concept of reciprocity, which is spreading human solidarity beyond the government institutions. This leads to the formulation of interactions between personalities. The french philosopher sees the equality as a basis of our friendship with another person. For him the friendship is an aim which complements the social or political institutions. As Levinas if the friendship shows reciprocity, moral obligations are asymmetric. The idea of immovability and indispensability shows the concept of the necessary concurrency as exchange, such as justice. Achieving the ethical purpose means that no distinction is made between you and me, between me and the other.

So the values of the postmodernity have their basis in otherness.

The french philosopher differs two relationships with the Other. The first is an attitude of intimacy with someone else who is present at its face. This is the attitude woven into short dialogic relationships of friendship and love. Perhaps through this side the ethical view shows its greatest universality.
“Living with” is not only of close ties, but also by all those distant connections woven into all institutions that make up life in society. This is related to the thirst for justice, which can not be separated from the level of the duty and the coercion. In this situation, my vis-à-vis is no longer the human marked by his face, and every person defined by its social role. This attitude with “everyone’s” is what Hannah Arendt calls "human diversity" in order to oppose the attitude of close in friendship and love.

The personality way discover other beyond any social mediation, respectively, without any immanent historical criterion is the neighbour. In the meeting to the human with human as personalized it comes to respect for one's neighbour. It is necessary to consolidate our own existence. We live thanks to the recognition from one's neighbour. It gives us value, which accepts us or rejects us back the image of our own value. In this sense, the creation of human subjects happens in a mutual formation of opinions, belief and recognition. My neighbour gives me meaning, returning me back the wavering image to me.

The source of the idea for a neighbour is the biblical parable of the good samaritan. Here the Jew represents the category of the stranger who is not part of the social group. He has no past, no authentic tradition unclean by race and piety, ie is the personification of the marginal subject. The samaritan's ability to compassion and mercy is a gesture that goes beyond the social role and functions of the character. Thus he discovers a social relation of man to the others like it. The behavior that perceives when he saves the failed Jew shows him as the inventor of a direct relation of man to man, which is not mediated by any instance or any social norms. The eschatological sense goes beyond compassion for one's neighbour.

The question arises, who is actually my neighbour, faced us with the problem of the myth of public life. The contemporary society is a world without neighbour. In an anti-modern attitude the Gospel may sound like a rebuke of one inhuman world of abstract, distant and anonymous relationships. The dream for neighbour becoming marginal for a technically formed society and a prophetic anticipation itself contribute to its destruction.

When they are stiff as two dimensions of a single story or two sides of mercy opposition socius and neighbour proved bogus according Ricoeur. The defect of modern society stand in a lack of charity.

All these reflections show that humanism as all other values in their postmodern interpretation have their basis in otherness.

References
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